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ABSTRACT
)e article examines the evolution of Mizrahi images in Israeli cinema 
in the past fifty years and, unlike most studies about Mizrahim in Israel, 
focuses on their positive portrayal. )e article demonstrates the construc-
tive ways Jewish immigrants from the Islamic world were incorporated into 
Israeli culture by positing three interrelated arguments. )e first is that early 
films incorporated Mizrahim into the fledgling Israeli nation by legitimiz-
ing them as Jews. )e second is that, once legitimized, Mizrahim were made 
part of the national Jewish family through marriage. )e third is that after 
becoming part of the [national] family Mizrahi men were then put in posi-
tions of control and, with the decline of Ashkenazi masculinity, eventually 
became more genuine or authentic representatives of Israeliness.
T  “”  I’ ethnic divide between Ashkenazi 
and Sephardi or Mizrahi Jews occurs in the opening scene of the famous 
 immigration comedy, Sallah Shabati.¹ )e film sets up the differences 
between two kinds of Jews right from the start. It opens with the landing of 
an airplane in the Tel-Aviv airport, from which two very different families 
of olim, or immigrants, emerge. )e first is a worldly American couple that 
briskly steps down the stairs, smartly dressed in matching suits, carrying a 
multitude of suitcases. Following the American burghers is a very different 
immigrant family: Sallah Shabati (Haim Topol)—the paterfamilias and the 
eponymous hero of the film, his seven children, his wife, and an assortment 
of relatives. )e family’s non-Western origin is patent from their disheveled, 
Levantine dress; a mixture of traditional and modern clothing items, from 
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their Arabic accent, and from their traditional religiosity. As they step onto 
the tarmac, Mr. Shabati kisses the ground and recites a blessing, echoed by 
a resounding “Amen” from his entire clan.
)us begin Sallah’s adventures in the Holy Land, where he is hood-
winked into accepting a “temporary” shelter in a decrepit Ma’abara, a 
transit camp for immigrants, where he is put to work in various mindless 
public works, where his vote is disingenuously solicited, and where he is 
patronized at every turn by callous Ashkenazim, social workers, politicians, 
and others. )roughout his ordeal, Sallah rarely loses his innate sweetness 
and good cheer. )ese, together with his irrepressible mischievousness and 
a good deal of street-smarts finally enable Sallah to beat the system, find 
decent housing and no doubt an honest job as well.²
Sallah Shabati became a household name in Israel and established him 
as the “Ur Mizrahi” whose image could later be seen in the Bourekas film 
genre of ethnic comedies that flourished during the s, in the more seri-
ous social commentaries and crime dramas from that time and finally in the 
Mizrahi identity films of the s. All of those works comment in some 
way or another on Sallah’s iconic image and explore two of its most iden-
tifiable characteristics: the Mizrahi as an artless and good-hearted fool and 
the Mizrahi as a degenerate criminal. In the end Sallah triumphs because 
of his good heart, the naïve economy of the film necessitates it, not because 
he works hard or fights bravely for social justice. He is also presented as 
somewhat degenerate, illiterate, dirty, lazy, alcoholic, and abusive of his 
family. All ensuing cinematic images of Mizrahim contended with these 
images in one way or another.
Despite the film’s unprecedented success most critiques were nega-
tive—early criticism focused on the misrepresentation of Israel’s immigra-
tion and social policies. Later criticism focused on the “colonial” nature of 
a Mizrahi image that was both written and directed by Ephraim Kishon, 
and played by actor, Haim Topol, both Ashkenazis.³
)is article re-examines these contentious images and discusses some 
of their more positive values. It offers three related propositions that deal 
with the perceived inferiority of Mizrahim. )e first is that early Israeli films 
attempt to verify Mizrahim as Jews. )e second is that, once their Jewish 
identity is validated, Mizrahim become part of the Jewish-Israeli family 
through marriage. )e third is that, once inside the family, many films 
attempt to bolster the masculine credentials of Mizrahi men as part of this 
[national] family and at times even as leaders of it. )e article examines 
the evolution of Mizrahi images in Israeli cinema since Sallah Shabati and 
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illustrates that by the s, Mizrahim, rather than being denigrated or 
marginalized, often epitomize the very idea of Israeliness.
Although Sallah Shabati was a commercial hit, its social and political 
value was questioned. Politicians and film critics were anxious about the 
negative and “false” image of Israel it portrayed. Few, however, doubted the 
veracity of the film’s portrayal of Mizrahim.⁴ Moreover, Sallah’s character 
as played by Topol was perceived to reflect a larger, Mizrahi collective. )is 
was perhaps the film’s most damaging imagistic aspect. Sallah’s naiveté does 
not merely serve as a satirical narrative ploy to expose the ills of the Zionist 
establishment. Shohat argues that the joke is also on Mr. Shabati, who is 
ridiculed for being a primitive “oriental” man. On the negative side, he is 
a potential criminal: lazy, drunk, illiterate, and violent.⁵ On the positive 
side, this primitive Mizrahi is warmer and more genuine than his cold 
and disconnected Ashkenazi betters. )ese opposing characteristics of the 
Mizrahi image were a recurring theme in subsequent Israeli films.
)e first significant evolution or development of the image of Mizra-
him after Sallah Shabati occurred in the Bourekas film genre, the ethnic 
comedies that proliferated in Israel during the s and s. Shabati’s 
character was not only the “Ur Mizrahi”, the film itself became the pro-
totype of a chain of “sequels”, which tried to capitalize on its success by 
copying its premise. Eventually termed “Bourekas” (after the cheap and 
savory pastries) these films faithfully followed the cinematic formula that 
was first laid out in Sallah. Most Bourekas films involved the struggles of a 
Mizrahi underdog against an alien, usually Ashkenazi, social, cultural, and 
political establishment; struggles that were often resolved through “inter”-
marriage: the weaker, Mizrahi character generally married into the stronger, 
more established Ashkenazi family. )e tension between the two poles of 
the Mizrahi character first seen in Sallah is evident in most Bourekas films, 
which use comedy and sentimentalism to avoid a serious involvement with 
some of the more problematic issues they raise. )is was perhaps the most 
ingenious invention of Bourekas films, which managed for the most part 
to maintain a delicate balance.⁶
)e s and s were important decades in the evolution of ethnic 
tensions between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in Israel and the continued 
popularity of Bourekas films attest both to the enduring fascination with 
the subject as well as to filmmakers’ ability to side-step its more serious 
aspects.⁷ If the directors’ balancing act may explain the popularity of the 
genre, which was almost the only kind of film that made money in Israel 
during those decades,⁸ the public’s continued tolerance of a film genre 
that perpetuated negative Mizrahi stereotypes may be harder to explain. 
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)e dismissal or silence of the critical establishment can be explained by a 
disinterest in the plethora of B, C, and sometimes D films that were pro-
duced under the Bourekas imprimatur.⁹ )e films’ attraction especially to 
Mizrahi audiences, who made up at least half of the movie going public at 
the time, is more enigmatic.¹⁰
One possible explanation for this paradox is the visibility which films 
depicting Mizrahim as leading men and women gave to a community 
that was underrepresented in Israeli public culture and politics. Bourekas 
films may have provided a fictitious sense of triumph and control that was 
divorced from reality, but the very possibility of it which the genre sug-
gested was satisfying for a while and served an important psychological need 
until the more tangible gains that came later. For members of a group who 
had little representation in their new country, these films offered an initial 
measure of recognition; if not for others, at least for Mizrahim themselves. 
)e official State institutions may have all but ignored them, but here were 
these popular films that not only depicted them and their traditions, but 
accorded them a measure of respect as well.
)e  film, Salamoniko, is about the attempts of a Sephardi foreman 
to get ahead in life by leaving his decrepit neighborhood and moving to an 
aﬄuent [Ashkenazi] part of town. Much of the film can be described as a 
cinematic celebration of the protagonist, Salomonico’s (Reuven Bar-Yotam) 
ethnic-religious heritage. One of the longest and more genuine scenes in 
this mediocre comedy is the Sabbath ritual in Salamonico’s household. Set 
against the hectic life of the characters who run around, scream at each 
other, and scramble throughout the film, the Sabbath scene stands out in 
its calmness, slow pace, and patient camera movements. Appearing as an 
anthropological study of Sephardi Jewish tradition—the Sabbath ritual 
and songs sung around the table, and the different dishes that the family 
members savor. Although the scene underscores the deterioration of the 
tradition it depicts (the family’s adolescent Sabra children are impatient 
and not as respectful of it as their parents would like) it remains a central 
feature of the film. When at the end Salamoniko abandons his plans and 
returns to his old, decrepit neighborhood, simply because he loves it, ‘warts 
and all’, the warm glow of the initial Sabbath scene stands as one of the 
most convincing arguments for his decision.¹¹
Much of the initial introduction of Mizrahim into Israeli culture took 
the form of such ethnic sentimentalism. )is was a central feature of Boure-
kas films, which thrived on it. It was only later, during the s, when 
Mizrahim were more genuinely incorporated into the Israeli body-culture 
that such expressions were labeled “Mizrahi Disneyland”.¹² During the 
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s and s, however, they were not perceived quite so negatively, as 
box office receipts attest, even if the joke was ultimately on the Mizrahim. 
Nearly every one of the Bourekas films included “anthropological” depic-
tions like the Sabbath ritual in Salamoniko. Although it may appear today 
as a somewhat naïve and perhaps even paternalistic public relations effort 
to endear Mizrahim by familiarizing us with their rich traditions, Bourekas 
films served to legitimize them, especially as Jews.
Since much of the Jewish world in Muslim countries was unknown 
to Ashkenazim before the Holocaust, Mizrahi Jews appeared almost “un-
Jewish” to their Ashkenazi brethren when they arrived en-mass in Israel after 
.¹³ )e repeated references in Bourekas films to non-Ashkenazi Jewish 
traditions and folklore were also aimed at conferring Mizrahim, who were 
often negatively compared to Arabs, literally as Jews.¹⁴ )e phrase “we’re 
all Jews” is frequently heard in the films and reveals one of the genre’s most 
important agendas: the construction of a Jewish, Israeli nationality that 
includes Mizrahim as a legitimate component.
Important recognition and legitimization occurs in the Bourekas film 
by Kishon, Officer Azulai () about the adventures of a hapless Miz-
rahi policeman. )e film follows many of the genre’s conventions, which 
Kishon himself suggested in Sallah, probably inadvertently, and which he 
continued to explore in this film. As with other such films at the time, the 
comedy is primarily based on ethnic humor, physical appearance, dress, 
accent, antics, etc., and on the conflict between an apparently inferior or 
inadequate Mizrahi character and his ostensibly worthier Ashkenazi supe-
riors. Unlike Mr. Shabati, however, who is really a bum, Azulai (Shaike 
Ophir) is unfit to be a policeman because he is simply too good to be an 
ordinary cop, not because he is lazy, uneducated, or even “primitive”. In 
fact, in what might have been an effort by Kishon to compensate for Mr. 
Shabati’s Mizrahi shortcomings, Azulai appears highly educated, over-
zealous in the execution of his duties, civilized, and chivalrous. )e film’s 
critique aims at exposing Kishon’s usual target, the incompetent socialist 
[Ashkenazi] establishment.¹⁵
Azulai’s advantage over his allegedly better, Ashkenazi superiors is 
gradually revealed– through his interactions with a visiting group of French 
policemen, with whom Azulai speaks fluent French;¹⁶ through his impres-
sive knowledge of traditional Jewish sources, with which he manages to dif-
fuse ultra orthodox demonstrators who clash with the police; and through 
his gentlemanly behavior toward women, both his wife and a young pros-
titute he arrests. By the end Azulai is understood as an erudite, worldly, 
and considerate Jewish gentleman—a mentsch, surpassing his crude and 
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small-minded superiors. His incompetence may have cost him his job in 
the police force, but he gained membership in a much more valuable group, 
that of the audience or the nation.
)is act of incorporation, inclusion, or compensation receives an 
intriguing expression in the film in the meeting of the two Mizrahi alter-
egos first encountered in Sallah—the fool and the criminal. In one scene in 
the film, Azulai takes his wife to the movies. Although off-duty, the over-
zealous Azulai thinks he spots a terrorist, when one of the viewers walks 
out of the theater in the middle of the film, leaving behind him on the 
floor a paper package. Azulai, who thinks he is an Arab terrorist, jumps on 
him only to find out, when the police arrive, that he is not a terrorist but a 
well-known local gangster, Amar (Yosef Shiloach). An embarrassed Azulai 
explains that the man who left the package behind, a few half-empty liquor 
bottles, looked like an Arab because of his dark complexion. “Me, an Arab?” 
the Arab-looking gangster with the Arab name asks with indignation. 
)e two are then made to reconcile by Azulai’s superior, who asks them 
to shake hands and make up. Facing each other closely the two then hug, 
showing their affection toward one another by speaking Arabic (!) together; 
both are Mizrahi Jews whose native tongue is Arabic. )ey conclude their 
reconciliation with the reassuring phrase, “we’re all Jews,” in Arabic.
)e two sides of the eponymous hero of Sallah, the clown and the 
crook, are developed in Officer Azulai into two distinct and independent 
characters, the diligent policeman and the degenerate criminal. Both are 
made to meet in the film in what appears like a literal dramatization of Mr. 
Shabati’s character traits. )e result serves two purposes. One is to formally 
introduce them to audiences, and if not to endear them to viewers, at least 
make them more palatable by acquaintance. )e other, more important 
purpose is to legitimize both as Jews. Beyond the immediate and obvious 
comic value of showing two Jews reaffirm their identity by using the lan-
guage of their enemies, their recognition of one another also validates their 
Mizrahi identity precisely because it is conducted in Arabic. )e moment 
of recognition becomes a moment of acceptance which is immediately 
reaffirmed in the following scene. After they make peace, Azulai and Amar 
go together to a nightclub where they while the night away in a Mizrahi 
“orgy”: they watch belly dancers, listen to Greek music, and finally dance 
the debka together, drunk on Ouzo, better known in Israel by its Arabic 
name, Arak.
)e images of Mizrahim in Azulai are problematic. )e dramatic 
elaboration of two of Mr. Shabati’s most negative characteristics: the joker 
and the crook, perpetuates these traits as Mizrahi markers. Despite these 
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negative images, Bourekas films also make many positive Mizrahi associa-
tions that revolve around the family and Jewish tradition. )is was the 
value and power of many Bourekas films, which rehashed these images and 
circulated them as legally tendered Jewish-Israeli identities. )is was no 
small matter considering some of the more mean images of non-Ashkenazi 
Jews that abounded in the culture shortly after the arrival of Jews from 
Muslim countries. In , Ha’aretz journalist Arie Gelblum called Jews 
from North Africa a “racial immigration” and estimated that they are 
“unable to understand anything spiritual” and “lack roots in Judaism.”¹⁷ 
By the s Sephardim or Mizrahim are closely associated in Jewish Israeli 
culture with traditional Judaism to the extent that they became the only 
meaningful expression of Jewish religiosity for the majority of a secular 
society alienated from more fundamental religious minorities, like national 
religious or ultra orthodox Jews.¹⁸
)e other recurring component of the Bourekas plot, my second 
proposition, is that marriage between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim com-
pleted this inclusion by bestowing conjugal sanctity on it. Many Bourekas 
films staged cinematic marriage ceremonies that carried a clear symbolic 
significance. After being verified religiously as bona fide Jews, Mizrahim 
became aligned to the Jewish-Israeli family and made part of it through 
marriage whereby a member of the new, immigrant community married 
a member of the veteran or native community. )is simplistic plot device, 
part of the genre’s rules to untangle the [melo]drama by providing an easy 
way out, a happy ending, elided the entrenched inequality between the two 
communities. As contrived and fictitious as it was, one cannot ignore the 
sanguine assumption on which it was based, that the offspring produced 
by such unions would combine the ethnic traditions of their parents and 
transcend them.¹⁹
)e conclusion of Salamoniko is a poignant case in point. )e wedding 
celebration of Salamoniko’s daughter Perlica (Eti Grotess)—who becomes 
pregnant from her Ashkenazi boyfriend Boaz Zimmerman (Menny Pe’er)—
is almost a parody of this device. After the two sides agree on a mixed 
marriage ceremony to include both Sephardi and Ashkenazi traditions, the 
party then unfolds as a cacophonous and campy display of different ethnic 
customs. Ladino, Greek, Yiddish, Spanish, Italian, Rumanian, and Hun-
garian songs and dances are crammed together in a crowded montage that 
becomes a parody of itself: one of the guests bursts into a choreographed 
rendition of the aria “La Donna e Mobile” from Verdi’s opera Rigoletto. )e 
performance has nothing to do with the wedding, of course. It is merely an 
expression of the exuberance of the moment of unification. Significantly, 
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the raucous montage ends with an enthusiastic joint performance of a 
familiar Israeli national ditty “for we’re a jolly good nation” (as in “for he’s 
a jolly good fellow”)—really a musical rendition of the phrase “we are all 
Jews”, with stanzas like “drink a toast and don’t be shy / for the youth who 
fought the war / for Yemenites, Algerians and German Jews / [and drink] 
for the national religious youth and for disco kids too.”²⁰
)is kind of morganatic marriage is common in the Bourekas genre, 
whereby the drama is relieved and the socio-economic disparity is overcome 
by having a disadvantaged Mizrahi marry an advantaged Ashkenazi. )is 
is the case in Sallah Shabati, where Sallah’s daughter and his son marry 
kibbutzniks, veteran Ashkenazi natives of Israel, and is repeated in many 
of the genre’s films, including in one of the last ones, A Little Bit of Luck 
(), directed by the king of Bourekas, Ze’ev Revah, in which the Mizrahi 
heroine gets together with her Ashkenazi childhood sweetheart after she 
endures many hardships.²¹
Although this marriage plot was often criticized as a shameful evasion 
of the much harsher reality it ignored, its cumulative effect was to further 
legitimize Mizrahim by including them as part of the Jewish-Israeli family. 
Following the legitimization of Mizrahim as Jews, the films drew them even 
closer by making them wives, husbands, and in-laws of Ashkenazim. Cin-
ematic marriages in the films were nothing but a cheap, narrative device and 
the films themselves never served a purpose other than providing transient 
entertainment. It can be argued that they even supported and prolonged the 
disadvantaged status of Mizrahim by presenting socio-economic mobility 
as a matter of chance, like winning the lottery. Although this may certainly 
be true, Bourekas films were after all a disposable form of entertainment 
and once they served their purpose, they gradually disappeared. )e genre 
peaked during the s as Israel’s diverse ethnic communities jostled for 
their place in the emerging Israeli nationality. Bourekas films reflected these 
tensions although their underlying assumption was always “we’re all Jews”. 
Nothing expressed that more clearly than a wedding.²²
Bourekas films did not only create a new Israeli family, in the process 
they also redefined or reshuﬄed gender roles, which is my third proposition. 
)e Bourekas genre introduced a new kind of masculinity that competed 
with that of the existing, New Hebrew masculinity that was constructed by 
Ashkenazi Zionists at the beginning of the twentieth century. )e reference 
here is to the “muscle Judaism” of early Zionism, as formulated by Max 
Nordau, that emerged as a reaction to common anti-Semitic images of Jews 
as weak, passive, and effeminate.²³ )e image of the New Hebrew man, 
slowly forged in the first decades of the twentieth century in the Jewish 
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settlement in Palestine, the Yishuv, was burnished during Israel’s War of 
Independence in . )e long and bloody war cost the small Yishuv  
of its members and was credited for the most part to the heroism of these 
New Hebrew men of the fledgling state and its nascent army.²⁴
)e image of the New Hebrew, as articulated in such literary classics 
as Moshe Shamir’s  He Walked in the Fields, continued to reverberate 
in Israeli culture and inform it after independence. It eventually came to be 
associated with the Israeli soldiers of the IDF rather than the much smaller 
group of pioneering fighters that characterized the pre-independence, 
mostly Ashkenazi, Yishuv. Since the IDF drafted everyone, Ashkenazim 
and Mizrahim, the ability to excel and attain the New Hebrew or Israeli 
manly status it conferred was potentially open to all irrespective of ethnic 
background. )e playing field for achieving “true” Israeli manhood was 
ostensibly leveled, enabling both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi men to “walk in 
the fields” to become New Hebrews.
)e  musical Kazablan is predicated on this premise, which it also 
examines. )e protagonist of the film, Yosef Siman-Tov (Yoram Gaon)—
nicknamed Kaza after the city of his birth, Casablanca in Morocco—is 
a decorated soldier in the  Six Day War. After the war, however, he 
cannot parlay his heroic service to the State into anything tangible, like a 
good job or a business.²⁵ Unemployed, he roams his poor neighborhood 
with other, unemployed Mizrahi young men, whom many of the neighbor-
hood’s Ashkenazi residents regard as criminals, gangsters. Kaza is in love 
with his beautiful, Ashkenazi neighbor Rachel (Efrat Lavi)—an affair which 
is strongly objected to by her parents on account of Kaza’s alleged criminal-
ity and his ethnic background. In the course of the film Kaza is wrongfully 
blamed for stealing money from Rachel’s parents, but is eventually acquit-
ted when the real thief is found out. Kaza then gets together with Rachel 
to begin a brighter future.
Kaza’s negative traits are both exaggerated and domesticated through 
the conventions of the musical. Styled in the image of the contemporaneous 
African-American Black Panthers, Kaza and his gang strike an exaggerated 
masculine pose, with their Afro hairdos, tight outfits, muscular bodies, and 
confident swagger. All of these are elaborated not just by the flashy outfits 
and gold jewelry, but especially by the song and dance numbers that draw 
attention to their flamboyant display. However, it is precisely the alleged 
hostility and violence that attract the sheltered Rachel, who is flattered by 
the attention of the neighborhood’s “bad boy”. )eir eventual love affair 
allows the film to offset, harness, or domesticate Kaza’s frustration and rage, 
which threaten to disrupt the socio-economic order.
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Kazablan is clearly a modern, Israeli fairytale about a “fair princess”, 
Rachel, and her brave and dashing “oriental prince”, Kaza. If a fairytale 
reflects a community’s hidden anxieties, desires, and values then Kaza’s 
placement in the role of the prince is telling. Even if we view the story 
as a sublimation of Ashkenazi fears of Mizrahi violence and rage, the fact 
remains that the prince, the desired male and the paragon of manhood, is 
Mizrahi. )e film stresses this fact by exaggerating Kaza’s virility and reflect-
ing and refracting it through the machismo of the men who surround him. 
Kaza is not only a war hero decorated for his bravery under fire, but also 
the leader of a gang of tough guys.
)e story is certainly contrived, “a macho rescue fantasy”, as Raz Yosef 
writes.²⁶ Kaza’s marriage to Rachel is a cheap narrative device; a shortcut 
intended to avoid a more serious contention with the cultural obstacles 
that prevent him from translating his military heroism into a successful 
post-army career. Kazablan, like many Bourekas and other films that deal 
with Ashkenazi-Mizrahi tensions, is explicit about the cultural marginality 
of Mizrahim, which Kaza epitomizes. )is is also the reason why imagery, 
specifically the construction of a Mizrahi masculine image, becomes such an 
important issue in those films. )e temporary inability to penetrate the real 
centers of Israeli power is initially overcome by the much easier manipula-
tion of their image as compensation; an image that often takes the shape 
of exaggerated masculinity.²⁷
)e emergence or cultivation of an exaggerated Mizrahi masculinity 
should be seen in the context of two interrelated developments. One is 
the decline of the image of the heroic New Hebrew as exemplified by the 
Palmachnik after the establishment of the State and especially the transi-
tion into a more normal, national existence. )e other is the concurrent 
emergence of a unique Mizrahi masculinity as a response to the crisis many 
Mizrahim experienced after immigration to Israel, especially the erosion 
in their patriarchal traditions. As the old, Ashkenazi, Zionist, pioneering 
masculinity waned between  and  a new Mizrahi masculinity 
challenged it. Both, however, exhibit surprisingly similar patterns of devel-
opment in which an image that is first formed as an aesthetic response 
to adversity eventually shapes culture and then history in a much more 
tangible sense.
)e New Hebrew refers to the aesthetic formulation of a “muscular 
Judaism” by ideologues, writers and artists like Max Nordau, )eodor 
Herzl, and Moses Lilienblum as an aesthetic response to the negative por-
trayal of Jews in Europe.²⁸ As the Yishuv developed, these aesthetic sen-
sibilities influenced the new Hebrew society and culture in more tangible 
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ways.²⁹ By , the neo-biblical farmer-fighters of early twentieth century 
Hebrew writer Moshe Smilansky, for instance, or Lilienblum’s illustrations 
of modern Maccabees, were almost literally embodied in the Palmachnik, 
the paramilitary soldier-farmer who was shaped in their image. What began 
as art gradually influenced life.
)e success of the Palmachnik in securing independence also led to his 
retreat from the forefront of the Zionist revolution once his job was done. 
As Israeli society became less mobilized and the zeal directed at founding 
the State was channeled into the more mundane business of running the 
country, the epic Palmachnik gave way to a more professional soldier.³⁰ 
)e romance of the nation’s birth became less romantic. )e heroes of the 
past gradually became tamed burghers, a middle class of skilled laborers, 
shopkeepers, businessmen, and politicians. )e image of the soldier-farmer 
continued to reverberate in the culture but it was increasingly relegated to 
the past, eventually becoming nostalgic and finally mythological.³¹
Mizrahi masculinity filled the space that was vacated by the retired 
New Hebrew man. Here too, the emergence of an overt, non-Ashkenazi 
masculinity as depicted in Kazablan originated as a reaction to negative ste-
reotypes of Mizrahim, very much like the dynamic that gave rise to the New 
Hebrew image at the end of the nineteenth century. )e hurried immigra-
tion to Israel of many Mizrahim during the s led to a breakdown in 
their traditional ways of life, which were drastically disrupted during and 
after their move. In addition to the usual vagaries of migration, the move 
to Israel exacted an especially high toll on Mizrahi families. Unlike many 
of the Ashkenazim who came prior to independence as young, single, and 
ideological pioneers, men and women who rebelled against their diasporic 
families, most Mizrahim moved to Israel as intact family units. )e opening 
of Sallah Shabati illustrates this well.
While this probably eased the move somewhat and provided a degree 
of comfort and sustenance during the crisis of uprooting, it raised other dif-
ficulties. Chief among them was the change in the role of the Mizrahi pater-
familias, whose position as head of the family was seriously undermined 
by immigration. Unlike their younger children, who adapted quicker and 
easier to the new culture they encountered in Israel, Mizrahi fathers were 
slower to do so. )e loss of property, professional accomplishments, secu-
rity that came with cultural familiarity, as well as middle-age, made the 
transition more difficult for the generation of Mizrahi parents. It did not 
help either that the traditional Arab cultures they came from were more 
patriarchal in comparison to the young and irreverent Israel. )e idea of 
honor, which was inextricably connected in Arab cultures to the traditional 
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role of men as fathers, brothers, and husbands, was eroded in the dynamic, 
socialist, and more sexually permissive Israel. )ese forces wreaked havoc 
on the actual function as well as the self-image of Mizrahi men, especially 
fathers and husbands.³²
In some ways, images of hyper-masculine Mizrahi men in Israeli culture, 
especially films, compensated for the emasculating immigration and absorp-
tion experience. )e loss of control over individual, family, and community 
life was channeled instead into the construction of an alternative fantasy of 
control, that of the macho male. Kaza’s gang members offset their socio-
economic marginality with an accomplishment that is shorter lived perhaps, 
but quicker and easier to attain, menacing their neighborhood. Brandishing 
their muscular bodies they gain the respect that otherwise eludes them, not 
just from their neighbors but from the establishment too, the police. )at 
they are feared rather than respected does not matter. )e hunger for respect 
is so pressing that it must suffice for the short run. )e leading song from 
the musical is literally called honor (kol hakavod) and touts Kaza’
)e formation of the Mizrahi macho man developed not just because 
of their disproportional concentration in the lower rungs of society, the 
“criminal” strata, but also against the decline or metamorphosis of Ash-
kenazi masculinity, which it eventually replaced. One of the most visible 
places where this shift occurred was in the realm of sex. In many films 
from the s and s Mizrahi men clearly emerge as sexual objects.³³ 
Sex, writes Raz Yosef, “offers for Mizrahi males a space for emotional and 
bodily expression, self-encouragement and self-affirmation that contests 
the oppressive conditions of Israeli social reality.”³⁴ For Yosef, however, 
this cultural construction indicates “the Orientalist beliefs of Zionist racist 
ideology” (!), which sees Mizrahim as people who “think” with their bodies 
rather than with their minds. However, if we consider the marriage cer-
emonies that conclude many Bourekas films for instance, and if we look 
especially at the gender division of these “mixed” marriages, a different 
picture emerges. In many of these films the desired male is Mizrahi while 
the desired female is Ashkenazi.
Kazablan is an obvious example, and so is Katz and Carasso, although 
in other ways. Both Kaza in Kazablan and Ossi Carasso (Yehuda Barkan) 
in Katz and Carasso are attractive partly because they are bad-boys, daring, 
independent men who defy social conventions. Kaza’s stylized defiance is 
expressed through his criminal association. Ossi’s “criminality” is subli-
mated and bourgeoisified by making him a playboy, a rich kid who runs 
wild, drives fast, expensive sports cars, lives lavishly, parties, and womanizes. 
)at is why he is so attractive to the Ashkenazi Naomi Katz (Efrat Lavi) the 
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quiet, bookish, and diffident daughter of his father’s business rival. )e film 
makes the gender associations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim not just 
doubly but squarely obvious by giving the Mizrahi Carasso two sons and 
the Ashkenazi Katz two daughters.³⁵
When the reverse occurs, as in Salamoniko, whose daughter Perlica 
marries the Ashkenazi Boaz Zimmerman, the attraction does not seem to be 
personal as much as connected to the boy’s economic status. When Salam-
oniko charges into the Zimmerman household to demand that Boaz marry 
his daughter after getting her pregnant, the scene emphasizes the aﬄuence 
of the parents much more than any personal attributes of their son or the 
connection between the lovers.³⁶ Entering the scene late and relegated to 
the margins of the frame, Boaz (Menny Pe’er) looks almost pathetic in 
his unfashionably baggy shorts and scrawny white legs; an effeminate and 
bookish mama’s boy, that is: a typical Ashkenazi.
)e image of Boaz Zimmerman as goody-two-shoes, a well-to-do, 
overly educated, and obedient Ashkenazi sap emerged simultaneously with 
the development of Mizrahi machismo and complimented it. )is is patent 
in movies like Lemon Popsicle ()—a huge hit that inspired seven sequels. 
Taking place in s Tel-Aviv, the film is a nostalgic coming-of-age story 
that revolves around three adolescent boys. )e moral hero of the film—
Bentzi (Yiftach Katzur)—is in love with the high school’s beauty, Nili 
(Anat Atzmon). Nili, however, prefers the handsomer and manlier Momo 
( Jonathan Segal) who dates her briefly but leaves her after he finds out that 
he got her pregnant. Bentzi, who truly cares for Nili, helps her go through 
an abortion, hoping to prove his real worth and the depth of his love for 
her. But after Nili recovers she leaves Bentzi and goes back to the dashing 
Momo again.³⁷
Directed by Boaz Davidson, who worked on many Bourekas films 
during his prolific career, Lemon Popsicle is an Ashkenazi Bourekas, that 
is, a “gefiltefish” comedy that focuses almost exclusively on Ashkenazi 
society.³⁸ Made a year after the historic  election, in which Mizrahi 
voters helped end  years of Ashkenazi political control by supporting the 
Likud, the film combines nostalgia for youth with nostalgia for an Israel 
unencumbered by ethnic divisions.³⁹ )e nostalgia, however, is selective. 
)e film does not hanker, for instance, for one of the central features of 
early s Israeli society: the heroic image of the Palmachnik. In fact, 
Bentzi, the film’s hero, offers a strikingly different image altogether. He is 
slight, quiet, introverted, and polite; almost a sissy. )is may indeed be the 
reason why he does not get the girl at the end. At the same time, he remains 
the undisputed hero of the film, a man whose inner worth and emotional 
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maturity is preferred by viewers to Momo’s greasy good looks and smarmy 
sex appeal. )e image of the forthright New Hebrew that emphasized body 
over mind, action over words, and practical experience over scholarly erudi-
tion changes in Lemon Popsicles. Bentzi is closer to the pre-Zionist Jewish 
weakling than he is to a brave Palmachnik or his IDF manifestation, the 
commando fighter.⁴⁰
)e transformation that the film depicts is an almost “transvaluation 
of values”, symbolic and important not just because it was validated by a 
number of successful sequels but also because it appeared at a specific junc-
ture in Israeli history. )e popular support that brought Likud to power 
signaled the first expression of real not simulated Mizrahi power. Until 
then, Mizrahim were primarily engaged in cultural identity politics, first 
proving their legitimacy as Jews, then making sure they marry into Ashke-
nazi families, and finally asserting themselves as men. )e vote for Likud 
realized the power and potential that was always inherent in these images. 
It lifted them from the screen and transformed them from a virtual force to 
a political one.⁴¹ Simultaneously the entrenched Ashkenazi regime and its 
supporters experienced a defeat that, symbolically, subjected them for the 
first time to the domination of Mizrahi power. Lemon Popsicle signals the 
reinterpretation of Ashkenazi masculinity as a reaction to these cultural-
political changes. )e slender, sensitive Bentzi is a new kind of Israeli hero, 
one that has more in common with his diasporic Jewish grandfathers than 
with his brave, New Hebrew father.
In the decades that followed, the image of the Ashkenazi as a “Bentzi”, 
a laflaf was further developed. Ashkenazi-laflaf became a common phrase 
to which leftist political leanings were usually added together with love 
of Arabs, Israel’s enemies.⁴² Having proved their masculinity during the 
War of Independence and having secured their financial future after , 
Ashkenazi men no longer had to prove themselves and could relax. At the 
same time, Mizrahi men developed the image of the ars in opposition to the 
laflaf. A Kaza-like Mizrahi man, the ars was confident, brash, and sexually 
attractive, someone who expended most of his energies, either aggressively 
toward men or sexually toward women, on ensuring others respect him.⁴³ 
)e ars’ preoccupation with respect, and his political nationalism fit well 
into some of the developments shown above, especially the historical alli-
ance with Likud as an expression of political rebellion. Toward the end of 
the s, two of the most extreme or visible models of Jewish masculinity 
in Israel were these two opposing types, the laflaf and the ars.⁴⁴
)e evolution of this division or development is clearly evident from 
some of the films quoted above. )e partial fusion of these two images in 
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the s is evident in a seminal film—Shuroo ()—directed by Savi 
Gabison, written by Jonathan Arout and Jonathan Raviv, in which a quasi-
Mizrahi guru becomes the spiritual guide of a group of Tel-Aviv Ashkenazi 
and Mizrahi socialites. Asher Yeshurun (Moshe Ivgy) is a charismatic loafer 
who lives in Tel-Aviv with his wife Shimrit (Keren Mor) a university student 
and a poet. His latest project is a self-help book on how to lead a happy life 
by teaching readers to be idiots. Surprisingly, even for him, Asher’s “philoso-
phy” attracts a small group of acolytes who hope to escape their numbing 
bourgeois life to find love, hope, meaning, and redemption through him. 
Shuroo is seminal because it is a film about a society in search of a meaning 
at a pivotal time in Israel’s history. Secondly, it is a film that clearly includes 
Mizrahim but takes no note of their difference. )irdly, to the extent that 
it does distinguish between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, the film positions 
the former in the role of spiritual guides or gurus.
)e film’s immediate success was due in large part to the timing of its 
release. )e fantastic, eerie atmosphere that took hold of Israel when SCUD 
missiles fell at the height of the Gulf War in  fit the bizarre comedic 
sensibilities of the film. It also came at a significant juncture in the country’s 
history, at the beginning of a so-called post-Zionist era when many of the 
country’s former truths were being reexamined. Shuroo is premised on a 
search, a spiritual search for meaning at a time made all the more confusing 
by the relative comfort of its characters’ lives. )e Oslo Accord of  and 
the concurrent mass immigration of Jews from Russia boosted the country 
politically and economically despite the first Intifada in . Since comfort 
was until that time a strange and unfamiliar condition for most Israelis, 
the film attempts to question or shake it with its acerbic humor and the 
seemingly disjointed episodes that make it up.
One of the more symbolic of these episodes involves members of 
a singing group, modeled on the real kibbutz troupe Gevatron. Dressed 
in white kibbutz shirts, the group of singers wanders through the streets 
of Tel-Aviv after a performance, looking for the bus that will take them 
back home; “a light-blue bus with sheaves of wheat painted on it”, as they 
describe it. Utterly lost, these stylized kibbutzniks look completely out of 
place in the gritty, late-night streets of Tel-Aviv. )e parody of good-old, 
labor-Zionist Israel which they convey, an old-fashioned and extinct kind 
of Zionism, becomes poignant during their performance of the film’s title 
song, Meir Ariel’s “)e Snake’s Slough”. Sitting on hay bales that neatly 
adorn the stage, they harmonize the sad and confused lyrics of Ariel’s urban 
existential poem as if it were one of the naïve songs from their usual reper-
toire, full of love for the land and its nature. )eir very appearance, stylized, 
'SPN#MBDLUP8IJUF t 
exaggerated, out of context, is ludicrous, of course, like their mellifluous 
rendition of the song, whose overly sweet harmony sounds absurd, out of 
place and especially out of time. )ese are not genuine country bumpkins 
who bumbled into town by mistake, but a carefully rehearsed simulation of 
the “kibbutz experience” on tour. It is a parody of the old-fashioned values 
of labor-Zionism on which the State was founded and which by then had 
become irrelevant and invalid; calcified remains of a glorious past.
Although Shuroo does not take direct note of its characters’ ethnicity, 
the trained Israeli eye and ear can nevertheless pick up on it. In addition 
to obvious Mizrahi accents and appearances, like those of the taxi driver 
Zhaki (Albert Iluz) or the vegetable grocer Mordecai (Yigal Adika), there 
are other hints. Asher’s ethnic background is never discussed, but the actor’s 
Moroccan background, his non-native Israeli accent with its rolling R, 
his probable Mizrahi name, as well as the way his aging father looks (he 
wears pajamas, a French beret, and stubbly facial hair) identify him almost 
certainly as Mizrahi. None of these matter. Unlike the obvious signs of 
difference in Sallah Shabati which drive the film’s drama, the distinctions 
between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim in Shuroo are blurred and unimportant 
from a dramatic standpoint.
Because Asher Yeshurun is Mizrahi, his status as guru is significant. 
His disciples are a motley bunch that include academics, business people, 
wealthy socialites, and miscellaneous others, Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. 
)e group’s diverse makeup illustrates the film’s tendency to obscure or in 
fact flatten ethnic distinctions in order to talk about a general “Israeli condi-
tion”. Aside from the group’s significance as a symbol of the Israeli collec-
tive, they all seem to suffer from acute ennui. Some of them, like Shimrit, 
write ludicrous poetry while her mentor, Professor Konar, cultivates sado-
masochistic tendencies. Others like the greengrocer Mordecai and the pub 
owner Eli explore their sexuality together, while others, like the television 
producer, Tal, try to express themselves by “flying” out of the window and 
end up crashing on the sidewalk beneath. All of these function more as 
eccentricities rather than the real problems of a privileged bourgeoisie who 
have nothing more serious to worry about.
Asher’s new-fangled philosophy fills the vacuum in these peoples’ lives. 
Nevertheless, his cultivation of idiocy as a way to happiness goes beyond the 
obvious satire of the self-help industry with its faddish dogmas and gurus 
to match. In a way, the inanity and nonsense Asher promotes are a nega-
tive mirror image of the high idealism of previous generations. To counter, 
resist, and protest the fervent ideals of the forefathers; ideals that have not 
only become irrelevant but also harmful, Asher, the grandson, chooses no 
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ideology at all, an attempt to vacate the mind from any thought whatever. 
“Didn’t you notice how idiots always smile?” he asks his interviewer on TV. 
“It’s because they’re happy.” His goal is to make people happy by encourag-
ing them to act like idiots. “Start by doing one inane thing a day,” he says 
to viewers, “you’ll immediately feel better.”
Although the film never says it quite so directly, Asher is an exorcist 
of sorts. He tries to cleanse people of an excess of lofty deeds or ideals, 
which at the historical moment he occupies in Israeli history have become 
far more damaging than inspiring or constructive. He voices an inchoate 
protest against an Israeli nationalism gone awry; a national ideology that has 
changed from redemptive to oppressive; from redeeming Jews to oppressing 
Arabs or Palestinians. )e ennui that inflicts the sated burghers in Shuroo 
is shockingly irresponsible in light of the problems that Israel faced at the 
time and especially in light of the plight of the Palestinians, their very close 
neighbors. Asher’s pursuit of idiocy, his encouragement to be “about noth-
ing” as the contemporaneous American TV star, Seinfeld, put it, is a biting 
satire. His failure at the end to help his followers reach a state of blissful 
emptiness is actually his only constructive success.⁴⁵
Ashers’ new idealism is to have no idealism at all. To that end his 
relationship with his mute and crippled father is telling. Asher’s wheel-
chair-bound father who does not talk highlights the shift between the first 
generation of Mizrahi immigrants and their Israeli children. )e father’s 
immobility and silence stand for his generation’s inability or reluctance to 
participate in Israeli politics and culture. )e father is literally crippled and 
dumb; a handicap for which the son compensates with his dynamism and 
his impressive communication skills. If the Mizrahi father has been silenced 
and disenfranchised, Asher, his Mizrahi son, is now completely in control, 
the Lux et Veritas, the guiding light, the Shuroo, that is Asher—guru of a 
new Israeli generation.
Asher’s ambiguous Mizrahi identity is also a function of his mixed 
masculine identity, which is part Mizrahi, part Ashkenazi. Although he is 
slightly dark, has a slight accent, and an obviously Mizrahi father, Asher 
is an integral part of Tel-Aviv bohemia. He sports fashionable sunglasses, 
a fashionable hairdo, wears smart clothes, has a poet for a wife, and con-
sorts with wealthy, sophisticated friends. )ese trappings were not usually 
associated with Mizrahim in films. In Salamoniko, for instance, these are 
precisely the marks that separate and alienate the protagonist’s Sephardi 
family from their wealthier, more educated neighbors. Asher is also the 
author of a book that helps people get in touch with their emotions. From 
a macho perspective, nothing can be more laflaf than this expression of 
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mind over body. “Real” men do not do such things. However, Asher is not 
a laflaf at all. He is confident and self-possessed; he is clearly a leader who 
commands honor from people and he is very attractive to women. He ably 
combines both masculinities, the Mizrahi and the Ashkenazi. )at is part 
of the reason why his ethnic background is ambiguous. It is also part of the 
film’s message, which is predicated on a fruitful mixture of opposites: men 
and women, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi.
Shuroo clearly brings an end to decades of cinematic separation between 
Mizrahim and Ashkenazim and presents a much more integrated society. 
In some respects, it can even be argued that the film presents Mizrahim in 
positions of control or at least authority. )e film charges Asher with the 
responsibility to question the past, fill the void created by the dawn of a new 
era and perhaps even articulate a new vision for the future. By integrating 
the Mizrahi Asher completely into Israeli society Shuroo ends the identity 
politics of the Bourekas film genre, the attempts to legitimize Mizrahim as 
Jews and incorporate them into the Israeli body-culture. His advancement 
to the center or even the forefront of Israeli society, the solid footing on 
which he stands in Shuroo, opens up Israeli cinema to a new kind of Mizrahi 
identity exploration. )is is no longer the apologia of the Bourekas with 
its socio-cultural, positivist agenda but a more genuine attempt to come to 
grips with Mizrahism.
N
Ephraim Kishon, director. I use Mizrahi in this article to designate non-. 
Ashkenazi Jews who originated in Muslim countries and were traditionally defined 
in Israel by their non-establishment status.
)e Yiddish-speaking American couple who traveled with Sallah is never . 
seen again. Presumably their wealth and connections eased their absorption 
considerably.
Ella Shohat sees the film as a classic example of Foucauldian power relations, . 
whereby Mizrahim are falsely represented and denigrated as a means of control. 
Ella Shohat, “Sallah Shabati: From Nowhere to Nothing,” Proza,  ( January–
March, ) – [Hebrew]. See the article at http://www.amalnet.k.il/sites/
commun/library/cinema/comi.htm.
Shohat writes that critic Yosef Sarik saw the film’s main value in its . 
documentary quality, Ibid, .
I began with Shohat’s critique not only because it is well-argued and semi-. 
nal but also because it provides a striking contrast to the eventual progression of 
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Mizrahi images in Israeli cinema. Her critique is based on postcolonial principals 
that are often ill suited to the Israeli case. See my study, Orientalism and the Hebrew 
Imagination (Ithaca, NY, ).
)e enduring popularity of Bourekas films was verified in a poll conducted . 
in  by Ynet, the web edition of the daily Yediot Ahronot. Four Bourekas films 
were included among the first  movies out of the  Israeli films ranked by 
viewers. )e genre’s popularity is its authenticity: “Bourekas films have remained 
the most uniquely Israeli cinematic genre [ever made in Israel].” Shmulik Duvde-
vani, “)e People Voted Sergio,” http://www.ynet.co.il/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/ 
CdaArticlePrintPreview/,,L-,.html, ...
I refer here primarily to the gradual rise in Mizrahi awareness that was . 
expressed politically through the ousting of the entrenched socialist and mostly 
Ashkenazi governments led by the Labor party and the support of the more nation-
alistic Likud party, which replaced it in . Cultural aspects of these changes 
included the increasing legitimacy of Mizrahi artistic expression in the national 
arena. In  Zohar Argov topped the national Mizrahi song contest, broadcast 
on national TV, with his electrifying performance of the song “)e Flower in My 
Garden,” paving the way for the unprecedented flowering of Mizrahi music in the 
s and s.
Nurit Gertz, . Motion Fiction, Israeli Fiction in Film (Tel-Aviv, ) [Hebrew].
Initially, most critics rejected Bourekas films as frivolous, escapist, anti-. 
Zionist, for refusing to seriously deal with the country’s pressing problems, Ibid., 
–.
)ere are no statistics on the specific ethnic background of movie-goers in . 
Israel. However, the high numbers of tickets sold and the relative low cost of movie 
tickets would support my hypothesis irrespective of income levels simply based 
on the percentage of Mizrahim in Israel, who, before the Russian immigration in 
the s, made up close to  of Israel’s Jewish population. Gertz lists several 
indices about the nature of Bourekas films’ viewers that identifies them indirectly 
as Mizrahi, noting that the number of movie tickets purchased in Israel during the 
s matches that of a country with a population of  million and not  million 
Israelis numbered then. Ibid., –.
One of the earliest versions of this kind of ethnic detail is Menachem Golan’s . 
 film, Fortuna, about the life of Moroccan immigrants in Israel’s south.
Rona Ra’anan-Shafrir, interview with Ronit Matalon, “No One Has to Read . 
)is,” Kolbo, March , .
Arie Gelblum’s notorious . Ha’aretz article of April ,  used racist termi-
nology to describe Jewish immigrants from Arab countries. )e theme frequently 
appeared in Hebrew literature. One of the Ashkenazi characters in Yehoshua 
Kenaz’s novel Infiltration (Tel-Aviv, ) , (about a group of army recruits in 
the s) writes the following to his Iraqi-born fellow soldier: “And you, are you 
Jews? You’re Arabs, that’s all you are. )ere aren’t any such Jews . . . you’re just Arabs 
who’re afraid of eating on Yom Kippur. )at’s all.” [Hebrew].
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)e importance of the Mizrahi ethnographic components as part of Boure-. 
kas films becomes especially apparent when compared to their absence in the quasi 
Bourekas films of Iraqi-born director George Ovadia. As cinematic prototypes of 
TV soap operas, Ovadia wrote, directed, and produced several sentimental melo-
dramas during the s and s that transcend the narrow ethnic confines of 
most Bourekas films (Nurit, ; Sarit, ). Precisely because they lack a lot of 
ethnic references, Ovadia’s films cannot be considered pure “Bourekas”. His films 
are Hebrew versions of the maudlin melodramas that were produced at the time 
all over the Arab world.
Kishon was Ashkenazi, but he did not support Ben-Gurion’s labor party.. 
Although Azulai’s background is unspecified, his last name and knowledge . 
of French identify him as Moroccan.
Gelblum wrote: “)is is a racial immigration the likes of which we had not . 
seen before in Israel . . . We have before us an incredibly primitive national group 
. . . Unlike the Yemenites, these Moroccans also lack Jewish roots.”
Eran Kaplan, “Israeli Jewry,” in Nicholas de Lange and Miri Freud-Kandel . 
(eds), Modern Judaism: An Oxford Guide (Oxford, ); Baruch Kimmerling, 
“Between Hegemony and Dormant Kulturkampf in Israel,” in Dan Urian and 
Efraim Karsh (eds), In Search of Identity: Jewish Aspects in Israeli Culture (London, 
) –.
Some scholars refute this premise and present it in a much more sinister . 
light. Raz Yosef sees this as a cooption of Mizrahim by the ruling Ashkenazi classes. 
He mentions a  Israeli joke that made light of this issue by predicting that 
Israel’s ethnic tensions will be solved in bed. Yosef regards the joke and the attitude 
it expresses as a glib attempt to cover up deep-seated Ashkenazi racial fears. See 
“)e Invention of Mizrahi Masculinity,” in Beyond Flesh (New Brunswick, NJ, 
) n. )e proliferation of Bourekas films and their popularity undermine 
his premise that the most that these films can be “accused” of is the promotion of 
the mantra “we are all Jews,” which tends to gloss over differences rather than face 
them directly. )e obsession with cultural and political unification has been an 
inherent part of Israel’s history. Mizrahim were not the only group to be co-opted. 
)e attempt to subjugate all immigrant groups to the Zionist pioneering ethos 
during the s and s has been conclusively documented by Tom Segev in 
, %e First Israelis (New York, ).
Raise your glass and drink without shame / to the health of the youth who . 
fought in the war / the Yemenites, the Algerians, the German Jews—/ the religious 
youth and the disco goers. Another, more elaborate example of this narrative can be 
seen in the  film Katz and Carasso, by the prolific B-movie director, Menahem 
Golan, which involves the competition between two insurance salesmen, the Ash-
kenazi Katz and the Sephardi Carasso (Sephardi and not Mizrahi because the Car-
asso family’s use of Ladino, Jewish-Spanish). Both compete for the same lucrative 
client, which they pursue with the help of their children, who are groomed as heirs 
to their parents’ business. Despite the hashed plot and predictable characterization, 
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the film features some of the best type-acting in Israeli cinema in general and the 
Bourekas genre in particular, with Shmuel Rodensky and Yosef Shiloach in the 
title roles. )e direction, too, is inspired for the genre, especially in the meticulous 
symmetry it maintains between the two sides. Much of the comedy derives from 
the parallel editing that goes back and forth between the two main characters and 
their families and constitutes an ironic commentary on their perceived differences. 
)e two men may look, speak, act, and eat differently, but on the most basic, 
technical level, they are in fact identical. )e symmetry between the two men is 
completed in the end by the marriage of Katz and Carasso’s children. None of Katz’ 
daughters and Carasso’s sons seem interested in the rivalry between their fathers, 
professionally or ethnically. )is is true even before they fall in love and marry. )e 
marriage completes and seals the parity that the film maintains between the two 
men, who can no longer compete with one another after their children marry; they 
are now one big happy family. )e Mizrahim and Ashkenazim in the film may be 
contrived and may have reflected little of Israeli society at the time, but it provided 
a powerful vision nevertheless.
)e film is much closer to George Ovadia’s melodramas than to Bourekas, . 
although it does retain this element of the genre.
Compare the iconic  film . Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? on interracial 
marriage in America. )e very discussion the film raises about the validity of such 
marriage (few US films raised the issue) underscores the Israeli difference.
)e issue has been studied extensively in the last decade or so. See for . 
example Daniel Boyarin, Unheroic Conduct: %e Rise of Heterosexuality and the 
Invention of the Jewish Man (Berkeley, CA, ) and Michael Gluzman, In the City 
of Slaughter: A Re-examination of Bialik’s Poem on its th Anniversary (Tel-Aviv, 
) [Hebrew].
)e power and penetration of this novel Jewish image can be seen in Otto . 
Preminger’s Hollywood  box office hit, Exodus, in which Paul Newman plays 
Ari Ben-Kna’an, a new Hebrew farmer-fighter in Israel’s war for independence.
)e film is based on a  play by Yigal Mossinsohn who originally set it . 
in the first years after independence. )e  film version was contemporized to 
make Siman-Tov a soldier in the  War. )e original play reflected the fate of 
many Mizrahi soldiers in the War of Independence. Because they were relatively 
new in the country and lacked the social and political connections of many Ashke-
nazim, they were unable to play a similarly active role in the social and economic 
life of the new country after the war. See Yehudit Hendel, Rehov Hamadregot 
(Tel-Aviv, ) [Hebrew].
Yosef, “)e Invention of Mizrahi Masculinity,” .. 
)is is true of films about these tensions written and directed by Ashke-. 
nazim or featuring Ashkenazi actors who portrayed Mizrahim. It is not necessarily 
as ironic as some critics suggest. Iconic images are often created from the outside, 
by members of one group about another as expressions of fear, wishful thinking, 
or as projections. Two examples are the negative images of Jews in the European 
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anti-Semitic imagination and the iconic images of cowboys in American classic 
Hollywood cinema. )e first was created by non-Jews about Jews out of competi-
tion and fear while the second were the projections of wishful-thinking by Jewish 
filmmakers about a non-Jewish culture they desired to adopt and enter.
Gilya Gerda Schmidt, . %e Art and Artists of the Fifth Zionist Congress,  
(New York, ).
See the introduction to my study, . Orientalism and the Hebrew Imagination.
James Diamond, . Homeland or Holy Land? %e Canaanite Critique of Israel 
(Bloomington, IN, ).
Amos Oz, “)e Trapists’ Monastery,” () in his, . Where the Jackals Howl 
(Tel-Aviv, ) [Hebrew]. Itsche is a legendary IDF commando, an exagger-
ated version of the Palmachnik, who dreams of becoming a bus driver after his 
discharge.
)e image of the broken, dejected, and humiliated Mizrahi father unable . 
to provide for his family is common in memoirs and other works. See Sami 
Michael, Protection (Tel-Aviv, ) [Hebrew]; Eli Amir, Scapegoat (Tel-Aviv, ) 
[Hebrew].
An essentially identical imagery is set up in the more serious and ambitious . 
film, Light Out of Nowhere () filmed in black and white, written and directed 
by Nissim Dayan in a new realistic style. Light looks like a documentary version 
of Kazablan, even though it does not focus too much on Mizrahi-Ashkenazi ten-
sions and lacks a central love story. Light does depict, however, a depressed Mizrahi 
neighborhood and community that offer very few choices to its members. )e 
story centers on two brothers and their father. )e older brother Baruch (Abie 
Zaltzberg) is the leader of a street gang. )e younger brother Shaul (Nissim Levy) 
is on the verge of manhood and has to choose whether to defy the establishment 
and become a gangster like his brother or become a manual laborer like his father. 
Shaul chooses neither, leaving the question open. Both Kazablan and Light Out of 
Nowhere link the machismo of Mizrahi images to crime. )is is no coincidence, 
since the exaggerated expressions of masculinity among criminals stem from some 
of the same frustrations, like the need to compensate for the lack of power in the 
“upperworld” with a big show of it in the underworld.
Sexual potency as a Mizrahi trait is common in cotemporary Hebrew litera-. 
ture. A. B. Yehoshua’s novel %e Lover (Tel-Aviv, ) recounts the sexual usurpa-
tion of the novel’s Ashkenazi paterfamilias by the younger, Sephardi Arditi, who 
becomes the lover of the protagonist’s wife. Amos Oz’s Black Box (Tel-Aviv, ) 
sets the same dichotomy between the cold and barren Ashkenazi paterfamilias, 
Alexander Gideon, and his warm and sexual Mizrahi foil, Michel Sommo, who 
replaces him and marries Gideon’s ex-wife, Ilana. Yehoshua Kenaz’s novel, Infil-
tration endows one of the main characters in the novel, the Sephardi Avner, with 
marked sexual prowess.
Yosef, “)e Invention of Mizrahi Masculinity,” .. 
Yahoo Carasso (Gadi Yagil) is initially portrayed as shy and diffident while . 
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Tikky Katz (Nitza Shaul), later his girlfriend, is more assertive and rebellious. )is 
aberration is gradually corrected after Yahoo runs away from home to join his more 
“manly” brother.
)e two lovers are given just enough attention to make their love story . 
plausible. More time is devoted to the cultural, social, and economic differences 
between them.
Earlier studies by Nurit Gertz and Miri Talmon note this phenomenon . 
as well. Both mention the changes in the perception and depiction of the native 
Sabra, which was increasingly associated in Bourekas and other films with a Mizrahi 
character. Gertz writes that these new Mizrahi heroes were often juxtaposed against 
effete, intellectual Ashkenazim (Motion Fiction, Israeli Fiction in Film, ). “)e 
more successful ethnic Bourekas films express the popular, unwritten norm, that 
privileges mischievous, anarchical and native-Israeli masculinity and by project-
ing it on the ethnic Mizrahi hero they move him from the margins of society into 
the bosom of the Israeli collectivity,” Talmon in Miri Talmon, Lost Sabra Blues 
(Tel-Aviv, )  [Hebrew].
)e film includes elements from Bourekas films, like ethnic humor and a . 
heavy reliance on music but it does not rely dramatically on ethnic tensions.
)ere is no overt indication, but the time of its release, obvious escapist . 
qualities, and the film’s soundtrack (almost exclusively made up of s Ameri-
can pop songs) makes this assessment plausible. See Dror Mish’ani, %e Ethnic 
Unconscious: %e Emergence of Mizrahiut in the Hebrew Literature of the Eighties 
(Tel-Aviv, ) [Hebrew].
Momo’s masculinity is not informed by these paradigms either. It may, . 
however, be informed by Mizrahi masculine imagery. Although he is Ashkenazi, 
he is darker than his two friends. See Noam Yoran, “Pickled Lemon,” Maaravon, 
 (winter, –) – [Hebrew].
Whether the Mizrahi vote for Likud improved their socio-economic status . 
is debatable, however, it found a political, rather than just a cultural expression.
According to Rubik Rosenthal’s . Dictionary of Slang ( Jerusalem, ) laflaf 
was coined in the s by Jojo Chalastra, (TV personality Zvika Hadar), just 
the last in a long series of names for the same kind of man, like yoram, gnicht, 
nachnach.
“)e New Ars,” . Ha’aretz, September , .
)ere were other, more common types of masculinity that were less polarized. . 
I use these two extremes mainly for illustration. See note  above.
Asher’s nonsensical character is one of a number of similar responses to . 
these frustrations. Several other artists at the end of the s and early s used 
nonsense as one of their chief artistic modes of expression. )ese include Orly 
Castel-Bloom’s short stories and novels, playwright and television writer Yosef 
Al-Dror, who inspired a nonsensical school that was very influential during those 
years and included the popular weekly Ha’ir and the hugely successful television 
skit show )e Chamber Quintet.
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Gertz writes: “Although these films purported to express the rebellion of . 
Sephardim against Israeli Ashkenazi society, which marginalized them, they actu-
ally forced the Sephardi hero to conform to its norms at the end.” Motion Fiction, 
Israeli Fiction in Film, .
